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IT’S NOW THE  
JOHN ROBERTS COURT 
Erwin Chemerinsky† 
N THE MOST IMPORTANT CASE in his seven years as Chief Justice, 
John Roberts wrote the majority opinion upholding the key 
provision of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act 
over the dissent of four conservative justices who would have 
invalidated the entire statute.1 Prior to this decision, only once in 
seven years had Chief Justice Roberts been in the majority in a 5-4 
decision joined by the four liberal members of the Court.2 In fact, 
rarely had Chief Justice Roberts been other than with the conserva-
tive justices when there was an ideological division on the Court. 
But three times in the last week of October Term 2011, Roberts 
sided with the liberals, twice in casting the deciding vote.3 
                                                                                                 
† Erwin Chemerinsky is the Dean and a Distinguished Professor of Law at the University of 
California, Irvine School of Law. 
1 National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 132 S.Ct. ___ (2012). 
2 Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220 (2006) (procedural due process was violated by 
the failure to provide adequate notice before a tax sale of property). 
3 In Arizona v. United States, 132 S.Ct. ___ (2012), also discussed below, Chief 
Justice Roberts joined the majority opinion of Justice Kennedy, which also was 
joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor. Had Chief Justice Roberts 
joined the dissenters – Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito – it would have been a 
4-4 split and the Ninth Circuit’s decision would have been affirmed by an evenly 
divided Court. In United States v. Alvarez, 132 S.Ct. ___ (2012), discussed be-
low, Chief Justice Roberts joined the opinion of Justice Kennedy, which was also 
joined by Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor; Justices Breyer and Kagan concurred 
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This, of course, does not make John Roberts a liberal. No matter 
how much his vote to uphold the Affordable Care Act disappointed 
conservatives, his overall voting record for seven years is consistent-
ly solidly conservative. But it does say that no longer can Chief Jus-
tice Roberts be taken for granted as another conservative vote along 
with Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito. For seven years, in virtually 
every ideologically divided case, it was Justice Kennedy who played 
the role as swing justice. Now Roberts has played that role and in 
the most important and dramatic of circumstances. 
None of this, of course, is to deprecate the continued crucial 
role of Justice Kennedy on the current Court. Once more, he was 
more often in the majority than any other justice, 93% of the time, 
and more often in the majority in 5-4 and 5-3 decisions than any 
other justice (12 of 16).  
But perhaps because of there being two possible swing justices 
this year as compared to other recent terms, the conservative posi-
tion prevailed less often this year than in the prior six years of the 
Roberts Court. There were key liberal victories, such as the deci-
sions about the health care law, Arizona’s SB 1070, limits on life 
sentences without parole for juvenile murderers, and free speech. 
But there also were crucial conservative victories in limiting contri-
butions to public employee unions, allowing strip searches of in-
mates without reasonable suspicion, and many civil rights cases 
where the Court made it harder to sue government officials. 
It is worth noting that the Court decided only 65 cases after 
briefing and oral arguments, the fewest in decades. In each of the 
prior two terms, the Court had decided 75 cases after briefing and 
oral arguments and as recently as the 1980s the Court was averaging 
over 160 cases a term. 
In this essay I review the decisions and implications in several key 
areas: the Affordable Care Act, Arizona’s immigration law, criminal 
procedure, the First Amendment, and civil rights litigation. 
 
                                                                                                 
in the judgment, while Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito dissented.  
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PATIENT PROTECTION AND 
AFFORDABLE CARE ACT 
he Supreme Court’s decision to uphold the individual mandate 
and most of the Affordable Care Act is now familiar to all. But 
what are its likely implications?  
There were three parts to the Court’s holding in National Federa-
tion of Independent Business v. Sebelius.4 First, by a 5-4 margin, the 
Court upheld the individual mandate, the centerpiece of the Act. 
There are 50 million Americans without health insurance and the 
Affordable Care Act seeks to remedy that. A crucial mechanism is to 
require that almost all individuals have health insurance and those 
that don’t must pay a penalty to the Internal Revenue Service. In-
surance companies are required to provide coverage to all and no 
longer can deny policies based on preexisting conditions, or charge 
higher premiums based on health conditions, or impose yearly or 
lifetime caps on payments. 
Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, So-
tomayor, and Kagan, said that the individual mandate is a tax and 
within the scope of Congress’s taxing power. He explained that the 
mandate is calculated like a tax; for example, in 2014, it is one per-
cent of income or $95 for those who do not purchase insurance. It is 
collected by the Internal Revenue Service and the funds go to the 
federal treasury; it will generate about $4 billion in 2014. The 
Court said that it was irrelevant that the Obama administration nev-
er called it a tax; the labels used by the government are not deter-
minative. 
This does not change the law in any way in terms of the scope of 
Congress’s taxing and spending power or how it is determined if 
something is a tax. At most, it is a reminder that if Congress wants 
to discourage behavior, it has the power to tax it. 
Second, five justices – Chief Justice Roberts and the four dis-
senters (Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito) – said that the 
individual mandate was not a constitutional exercise of Congress’s 
                                                                                                 
4 132 S.Ct. ___ (2012).  
T 
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commerce clause power. They said that Congress under the com-
merce clause may regulate economic activity that taken cumulative-
ly has a substantial effect on interstate commerce. They saw the in-
dividual mandate as regulating inactivity, regulating those not en-
gaged in commerce, and thus exceeding the scope of Congress’s 
power. 
I think that this is fundamentally misguided because all are en-
gaged in economic activity with regard to health care; as Justice 
Ginsburg pointed out, over 99% of people will receive medical care 
in their lifetimes and 60% of the uninsured do so each year. Every-
one is engaged in economic activity in that they are either purchas-
ing insurance or self-insuring; Congress is regulating the latter eco-
nomic behavior. 
The five justices have created a new distinction limiting Con-
gress’s commerce power: it can regulate activity, not inactivity. 
How much will this matter? Perhaps little in that Congress rarely is 
going to compel economic transactions. On the other hand, any dis-
tinctions like “activity/inactivity” or “direct/indirect”5 are an open 
invitation to litigation where a great deal turns on labels and charac-
terizations.  
Consider an example: Title II of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 
which was adopted under Congress’s commerce clause power, pro-
hibits hotels and restaurants from discriminating on the basis of 
race.6 Does that law regulate the “inactivity” of hotels and restau-
rants that refused to serve African-Americans, or was it regulating 
“activity”? I am not suggesting that the Court will strike down Title 
II, but it does illustrate how much can turn on a label.  
Finally, the Court in a 7-2 ruling held that it exceeded the scope 
of Congress’s spending power and violated the Tenth Amendment 
for the Act to deny all Medicaid funding to states that do not comply 
with the new conditions for Medicaid. The Act requires that states 
cover within their Medicaid programs those within 133% of the 
                                                                                                 
5 See A.L.A. Schecter Poultry v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1936) (drawing a 
distinction between direct and indirect effects on commerce). 
6 This was upheld in Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964). 
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federal poverty level. The federal government pays 100% of these 
costs until 2019 and 90% thereafter. Any state that failed to comply 
would lose all of its Medicaid funds.  
The Court said that it was unduly coercive to tie existing Medi-
caid funds to a failure to comply with a new requirement. The 
Court saw two Medicaid programs, the old one and the new re-
quirements, and said that it was impermissible to tie existing funds 
to the failure to comply with new requirements. But why see this as 
two programs rather than one? Moreover, why see this as Congress’ 
coercing – or to use Chief Justice Roberts’ word, “dragooning” – 
the states? Admittedly, given the huge amount of money involved, 
any state would face a hard choice to turn it down. But there is a 
basic difference between being forced to do something and facing a 
very difficult choice. 
It is this part of the opinion that is likely to have the broadest im-
plications. This is the first time that the Court ever has found condi-
tions on federal funds to be so coercive as to be unconstitutional. 
Countless federal statutes provide funds to state and local govern-
ments on the condition that they comply with requirements. There 
likely will be challenges to many of these laws on the ground that 
the requirements are too coercive. 
For example, the federal Solomon Amendment provides that if 
any law school refuses to allow the military to recruit on campus, its 
university will lose all federal funds. Similarly, federal law provides 
that if a university program discriminates based on race, the entire 
university and not just that program will lose its federal funding. 
Many federal environmental laws operate through conditions on 
state and local governments receiving money. The Court gave little 
guidance as to how to decide when conditions are too coercive and 
that will lead to a great deal of litigation. 
IMMIGRATION 
rizona’s SB 1070 declares its purpose to be decreasing the 
presence in the state of undocumented immigrants through 
aggressive law enforcement and attrition. In 2010, federal district 
court judge Susan Bolton issued a preliminary injunction against 
A 
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four key provisions of SB 1070.7 In Arizona v. United States, the Su-
preme Court in a 5-3 ruling affirmed almost all of Judge Bolton’s 
preliminary injunction.8 Justice Kennedy wrote for the majority and 
was joined by Roberts, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor. Justice 
Kagan was recused. 
Justice Kennedy began by accepting the argument of the United 
States that immigration is solely in the control of the federal gov-
ernment. Anything done with regard to immigration has foreign 
policy implications and states cannot have their own foreign policy. 
The Court quoted its 1942 ruling in Hines v. Davidowitz, that states 
cannot “contradict or complement” federal immigration efforts.9 
The Court affirmed three parts of Judge Bolton’s preliminary in-
junction, finding unconstitutional as preempted by federal law the 
provisions of SB 1070 that require non-citizens to carry papers at all 
times showing that they are lawfully in the country, that prohibit 
those not lawfully in the country from seeking or receiving em-
ployment in Arizona, and that allow police to arrest individuals 
without warrants when there is probable cause that they are deport-
able. 
The Court reversed the preliminary injunction as to the provi-
sion which allows police to question individuals about their immi-
gration status if they are stopped for other reasons and if there is 
reasonable suspicion that they are not lawfully in the United States. 
Even this provision was substantially narrowed as the Court held 
that police cannot extend the duration of a stop to check immigra-
tion status and also that state and local police cannot arrest individu-
als who they determine to be illegally in the country. Moreover, the 
Court left open the possibility of an “as applied” challenge to this 
provision of SB 1070 if it could be shown that it was being applied in 
a racially discriminatory fashion. 
The decision is a clear message to state governments that laws 
like SB 1070 are unconstitutional because they intrude on the feder-
                                                                                                 
7 United States v. Arizona, 703 F.Supp.2d 980 (D.Ariz. 2010). 
8 132 S.Ct. ___ (2012). 
9 312 U.S. 41 (1942). 
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al government’s exclusive power to control immigration. The one 
part of the preliminary injunction reversed by the Supreme Court 
has potentially very troubling implications. Realistically, it seems 
inevitable that police will decide who to question about immigration 
status based on surname and skin color. But that challenge, which 
was expressly left open by Justice Kennedy’s opinion, will need to 
wait until another case. 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
rom a practical perspective, the decisions that will most affect 
the practice of law and what judges do on a daily basis are Mis-
souri v. Frye10 and Lafler v. Cooper.11 In two 5-4 decisions, with Justice 
Kennedy writing for Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and 
Kagan, the Court held that the right to effective assistance of coun-
sel applies at the plea bargaining stage. Justice Kennedy explained 
that plea bargaining is a critical stage of criminal proceedings: 97% 
of all convictions in federal court and 94% of all convictions in state 
court are gained via guilty pleas.  
The Court said that the two-part test for ineffective assistance of 
counsel articulated in Strickland v. Washington is to be applied.12 
First, a defendant must demonstrate that counsel’s performance was 
so deficient as to negate representation. Second, the defendant must 
show prejudice. The Court said that this requires that the defendant 
show that he or she likely would have accepted the plea bargain, that 
the prosecutor likely would not have withdrawn it, and that the 
judge likely would have allowed the plea agreement. 
The decisions likely will change how plea bargaining is done in 
many jurisdictions, causing it to be more formal and put in writing. 
Also, it already is leading to a large number of individuals arguing 
that their pleas were the product of ineffective assistance of counsel. 
The difficult inquiry for the courts will be how to assess prejudice. 
For example, how are they to assess whether the judge would have 
allowed the plea? 
                                                                                                 
10 132 S.Ct. 1399 (2012). 
11 132 S.Ct. 1376 (2012). 
12 466 U.S. 688 (1984). 
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It is important to note that Lafler v. Cooper was before the Court 
on a writ of habeas corpus. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), a federal 
court may grant a writ of habeas corpus only if the state court deci-
sion is “contrary to” or an “unreasonable application” of clearly es-
tablished law as announced by the Supreme Court. The fact that the 
Supreme Court found this standard to be met means that it did not 
regard its decision as creating new law. Thus, it seems clear that 
these decisions will apply retroactively and open the door to a large 
number of claims by people who pled guilty, but believe that there 
was ineffective assistance of counsel. 
In Miller v. Alabama,13 the Court held that a mandatory sentence 
of life imprisonment without parole for a homicide committed by a 
juvenile is cruel and unusual punishment. Justice Kagan wrote for 
the majority and was joined by Justices Kennedy, Ginsburg, Breyer, 
and Sotomayor. The Court did not create an absolute bar to such a 
punishment, but said that there must be an individual determination 
that justifies such a sentence, which the Court indicated should be 
rare. This is different from Roper v. Simmons,14 which held that there 
never can be the death penalty for a crime committed by a juvenile, 
or Graham v. Florida,15 which held that there never can be a sentence 
of life without parole for a non-homicide crime committed by a ju-
venile. 
This likely will have the practical consequence of requiring a 
penalty phase when a prosecutor wants a sentence of life without 
parole for a homicide committed by a juvenile. The jury will need 
to find the aggravating factors that warrant such a penalty. There is 
likely to be immediate litigation over whether this applies retroac-
tively. In saying that a punishment is unconstitutional, Miller v. Ala-
bama would seem to apply retroactively. On the other hand, if it is 
seen as imposing a new procedural requirement – a penalty phase 
hearing before a juvenile can be sentenced to life without parole for 
homicide crimes – this would not be retroactive. 
                                                                                                 
13 132 S.Ct. ___ (2012). 
14 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
15 130 S.Ct. 2011 (2010). 
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There were two Fourth Amendment decisions. I long have 
thought that the Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment decisions can 
be explained by a simple predictive principle: if the justices can im-
agine it happening to them, then it violates the Fourth Amendment. 
That certainly explains both of this year’s Fourth Amendment rul-
ings. 
In United States v. Jones,16 the Court held that it violated the 
Fourth Amendment for the police to place a GPS device on a per-
son’s car and track his movements for 28 days without a valid war-
rant. Although the result was unanimous, the justices differed in 
their reasoning. Justice Scalia, in an opinion joined by Roberts, 
Kennedy, Thomas, and Sotomayor, pointed to a 1765 English deci-
sion, Entick v. Carrington, which would have treated the placing of 
the GPS device as a trespass, thus making it a search for modern 
Fourth Amendment purposes. Justice Alito wrote an opinion con-
curring in the judgment joined by the other justices in which he ar-
gued that it makes no sense to decide what is a search in 2012 by 
looking to 18th-century English decisions. He said that the focus 
should be on whether there is an invasion of the reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy. 
But neither of these approaches is likely to be very useful when 
courts confront, as they inevitably will, the question of when the 
use of satellites and drones to gather information violates the Fourth 
Amendment. Surely 18th-century English law will not be helpful 
with this. Nor, though, will Justice Alito’s approach be helpful. We 
have no reasonable expectation of privacy when we are on public 
streets; the police could have had an undercover agent follow Jones 
every minute he was outside and never needed a warrant. What is 
needed, as Justice Sotomayor pointed out in her concurring opin-
ion, is a new approach for deciding when people have the Fourth 
Amendment right to keep information from the government unless 
it has a valid warrant. 
In Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders,17 the Court ruled, 5-4, 
                                                                                                 
16 132 S.Ct. 945 (2012). 
17 132 S.Ct. 1510 (2012). 
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that jails may subject inmates to strip searches without any need for 
reasonable suspicion. Justice Kennedy, in an opinion joined by Rob-
erts, Scalia, Thomas, and Alito, said that the interest of jails in en-
suring security and preventing drugs and weapons from being smug-
gled in was sufficient to permit strip searches without any need for 
reasonable suspicion. It is a case which reflects the tremendous def-
erence of the conservative majority to claims by jails and prisons of 
the need to restrict the rights of inmates. 
FIRST AMENDMENT 
n Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. EEOC,18 
the Court held that it violates both the free exercise and the estab-
lishment clauses of the First Amendment to hold a religious institu-
tion liable for choices it makes as to who will be its ministers. The 
case involved a teacher at a parochial elementary school who took a 
leave of absence because of a serious illness. The Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission sued on her behalf when the school filled 
her position when she was ill and then fired her when the school 
thought she might be contemplating an action under the Americans 
with Disabilities Act. 
Chief Justice Roberts, writing for a unanimous Court, said that 
the teacher was deemed a “minister” by the school, having taken the 
requisite courses at a religious college and been approved by the 
board of the school for this designation. The Court said that it 
would be unconstitutional to hold the school liable under employ-
ment discrimination law for the choices it makes as to who will be 
its ministers. 
What, then, if a religious institution designates all of its employ-
ees to be ministers? It would seemingly then be exempt from all 
employment discrimination laws. In fact, this is the first time the 
Supreme Court ever has found a First Amendment exemption for 
religious institutions from the application of civil rights statutes. It 
undoubtedly will open the door to many more such challenges in 
the future. 
                                                                                                 
18 132 S.Ct. 694 (2012). 
I 
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There were two important speech cases. In United States v. Alva-
rez,19 the Court declared unconstitutional the federal Stolen Valor 
Act, which makes it a crime for a person to falsely claim to have 
received a military honor or declaration. Justice Kennedy wrote for 
a plurality of four and concluded that the law imposed a content-
based restriction on speech and thus had to meet the most exacting 
scrutiny. He explained that the government failed this test because 
it did not prove any harm from false claims of military honors and 
because the government could achieve its goals through less restric-
tive alternatives. Perhaps most importantly for the future, he reject-
ed the government’s argument that false speech is inherently outside 
the scope of the First Amendment. 
Justice Breyer concurred in the judgment, joined by Justice Ka-
gan. He said that he would use intermediate rather than strict scru-
tiny and that the law failed this test because it was not narrowly tai-
lored. He suggested that a narrower statute, one that prohibits false 
claims of military honors with the goal of receiving a tangible bene-
fit, likely would be constitutional. Congress may well adopt exactly 
that type of law. 
The other major speech case was Knox v. SEIU.20 In Abood v. De-
troit Board of Education,21 the Court held that public employees can-
not be forced to join a union, but they must pay for the collective 
bargaining activities of the union since they benefit from them. They 
cannot, however, be required to support the political activities of 
the union. In subsequent cases, the Court made clear that those who 
do not want to support the political activities can “opt out” of doing 
so and must be given an accounting as to the percentage of dues that 
are used for collective bargaining as opposed to political activities. 
In Knox, Justice Alito, joined by Roberts, Scalia, Kennedy, and 
Thomas, held that at least as to special assessments for political 
campaigns, non-members must not be assessed unless they “opt in” 
and affirmatively choose to give support, as opposed to being as-
                                                                                                 
19 132 S.Ct. ___ (2012). 
20 132 S.Ct. ___ (2012). 
21 431 U.S. 209 (1977). 
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sessed unless they opt out. As was pointed out by Justices So-
tomayor and Breyer, in separate opinions, this is a major change in 
the law and there is no reason this will be limited to special assess-
ments.  
Justice Alito’s reasoning will seemingly require non-members 
always to be subject to an opt-in system and make the long-standing 
opt-out system unconstitutional. This will significantly decrease the 
funds for public employee unions to participate in the political pro-
cess. It is ironic that the same Supreme Court that so strengthened 
the political power of corporations in Citizens United v. Federal Elec-
tion Commission22 has significantly decreased the political strength of 
unions. 
CIVIL RIGHTS 
he plaintiffs lost in every civil rights case where they were seek-
ing money damages. For example, in Minecci v. Pollard,23 the 
Supreme Court held that prison guards at private prisons contract-
ing with the federal government cannot be sued for constitutional 
violations where state tort law provides a remedy. The Court said 
that no Bivens claim could be brought by a prisoner who suffered 
physical injuries and claimed an Eighth Amendment violation be-
cause state tort law provided some remedy, even though not the 
same as would be available in a Bivens action.24 Justice Breyer writ-
ing for the Court, with only Justice Ginsburg dissenting, stated: 
Where, as here, a federal prisoner seeks damages from private-
ly employed personnel working at a privately operated federal 
prison, where the conduct allegedly amounts to a violation of 
the Eighth Amendment, and where that conduct is of a kind 
that typically falls within the scope of traditional state tort law 
(such as the conduct involving improper medical care at issue 
here), the prisoner must seek a remedy under state tort law. 
We cannot imply a Bivens remedy in such a case.25 
                                                                                                 
22 130 S.Ct. 876 (2010). 
23 132 S.Ct. 617 (2012). 
24 Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). 
25 132 S.Ct. at 626. 
T 
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Private prisons operating under contracts with the government 
are increasingly common and this will make it much more difficult 
for prisoners in facilities contracting with the federal government to 
sue. But the Court’s reasoning suggests an even greater significance 
to the case: for the first time, the Court has said that the existence 
of state remedies can preclude a Bivens cause of action. In a number 
of cases, the Court had said that the existence of a federal statutory 
remedy could preclude Bivens actions. But in Bivens itself the Court 
had rejected the argument that a state tort remedy was a reason to 
deny a federal cause of action for a constitutional violation. 
In Ryburn v. Huff,26 the Court held that police officials were pro-
tected by qualified immunity when they entered a home without a 
warrant and without the permission of the occupants. Government 
officials who are sued for money damages for constitutional viola-
tions, whether state and local officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or 
federal officers in a Bivens action, may assert immunity as a defense. 
A few officers – such as prosecutors performing prosecutorial ac-
tions, judges performing judicial actions, and legislators performing 
legislative actions – have absolute immunity to suits for money dam-
ages. All other officers have qualified immunity and may be held 
liable for their discretionary acts only if they violate clearly estab-
lished law that a reasonable officer should know. 
The courts have long struggled with how to determine what is 
clearly established law that the reasonable officer should know. In 
Hope v. Pelzer,27 the Court held that there does not need to be a case 
on point in order to overcome qualified immunity. Hope v. Pelzer 
involved prison guards who tied a prisoner to a hitching post and 
left him in the hot sun for seven hours with almost no water and no 
access to a bathroom. The federal court of appeals ruled that the 
prison guards had engaged in cruel and unusual punishment in viola-
tion of the Eighth Amendment, but held that the guards were pro-
tected by qualified immunity because there was no case on point 
holding that this was unconstitutional. The Supreme Court reversed 
                                                                                                 
26 132 S.Ct. 987 (2012). 
27 536 U.S. 730 (2002). 
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and expressly held that a case on point is not necessary so long as 
officers have “fair warning” that their conduct is unconstitutional. 
Otherwise, of course, egregious unconstitutional actions would be 
shielded from liability if they had not been done before and thus had 
not been specifically disapproved by the courts. 
However, in recent cases, without acknowledging it was doing 
so, the Court has backed away from Hope v. Pelzer and found quali-
fied immunity because there was not a specific case on point. For 
example, in Ashcroft v. Al-Kidd,28 the Court held that the Attorney 
General was protected by qualified immunity for authorizing a per-
son to be held on a material witness warrant even though there nev-
er had been any desire to use the person as a material witness and 
there was no suspicion that the person had committed any crime.  
Similarly, in the recent ruling in Ryburn v. Huff, the Court found 
qualified immunity based on the absence of a case on point.29 A ru-
mor circulated in a high school that a student there had threatened 
violence. The police went to the boy’s home to investigate. The boy 
and his mother came out of the house and answered the police ques-
tions. The officer asked permission to enter the home and the moth-
er refused. When the mother entered the home, the police officer 
followed without permission and against her wishes. The officer said 
that his experience was that parents usually allow officers in their 
home when asked for consent. The police found no weapons or oth-
er contraband and ultimately concluded that the rumors about the 
boy were unfounded. 
The Ninth Circuit rejected qualified immunity. The Supreme 
Court, in a per curium opinion, reversed. Once more, the Court 
stressed the absence of decisions on point and said: “No decision of 
this Court has found a Fourth Amendment violation on facts even 
roughly comparable to those present in this case.”30 The Court said 
that its precedents had allowed police to enter a home when there 
was a fear of violence. But those decisions had allowed police to 
                                                                                                 
28 131 S.Ct. 2074 (2011). 
29 132 S.Ct. 987 (2012). 
30 132 S.Ct. at 990. 
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enter when there was reason to believe that there might be violence 
in the home; here it was a only a rumor and there was no basis for 
suspicion other than the occupant of the home not wanting the po-
lice to enter. 
The Court, of course, has not overruled Hope v. Pelzer. But it is 
notable that in neither of these cases was it cited; nor did the Court 
focus on what should be the central inquiry under Hope v. Pelzer: did 
the officer have fair notice that the conduct violated the Constitu-
tion? Requiring that the plaintiff have a case on point to overcome 
qualified immunity will create an obstacle for civil rights plaintiffs in 
many cases. 
NEXT YEAR 
lready on the docket for next year is the issue of whether col-
leges and universities may continue to use race as a factor in 
admissions decisions to benefit minorities (Fisher v. University of Tex-
as, Austin).31 Also, the Court will decide whether companies can be 
sued in the United States for their foreign human rights violations 
under the Alien Tort Statute (Kiobel v. Dutch Petroleum).32 And it 
seems highly likely that the Court will decide whether there is a 
constitutional right to marriage equality for gays and lesbians. It is 





                                                                                                 
31 Cert. granted, 132 S.Ct. 1656 (2012). 
32 Set for rehearing and reargument, 132 S.Ct. 1738 (2012). 
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